regulation was not the sole property of the left. Chicago school economists were developing the economic theory of regulation, modeling regulation as a series of mutually-beneficialexchanges between profit-maximizing firms and vote-maximizing legislators (see Stigler 1971) . Despite the obvious ideological differences, there was a broad consensus that many regulations protected the regulated interests, foisting the costs on to the public. As the arguments against regulation mounted, stagflation created a window of opportunity for policy change. Excessive regulation was linked-albeit, often only rhetorically-to rising inflation, stagnant growth, and flailing competitiveness. Policymakers concluded that the costs of economic regulations often exceeded whatever benefits might be claimed. Deregulatory initiatives were successfully introduced in commercial banking, communications, and air and surface transportation. In some cases, these initiatives mandated the wholesale elimination of well-established regulatory agencies. When combined with the rejection of Keynesian demand management, the promotion of greater trade liberalization, and welfare reform, deregulation became one of the pillars of neoliberalism. If earlier policy regimes had vested authority in state institutions in the hope of forcing higher levels of corporate accountability and compensating for market failure, these grants had been revoked in the name of efficiency.
Deregulation was only one part of the reform agenda. Beginning in the early 1970s, presidents established ever more demanding systems of regulatory review.
Although the Ford and Carter administrations imposed relatively unobtrusive analytical requirements such that agencies could often compose cost-benefit analyses ex post facto, the Reagan presidency marked a sea change. In 1981, Reagan"s executive order 12291 required agencies to submit regulatory impact analyses grounded in cost-benefit analysis to the Office of Management and Budget"s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OMB OIRA). If agencies failed to make the affirmative case that new regulations generated net benefits, OMB OIRA was authorized to prohibit them from publishing notice of rulemaking in the Federal Register, thereby stopping the regulatory process (McGarity 1991) . Even if the new social regulatory agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) survived the deregulatory fervor of the era, they were deeply impacted by the new review requirements. The timing of costs and benefits intrinsic to many social regulatory policies-they imposed large initial compliance costs and generated a flow of benefits that accrue in the distant future-were particularly difficult to justify when discounted to present value. Moreover, the costs of completing the regulatory impact analyses stressed the resources of agencies already working under significant budgetary constraints.
There is much to suggest that the introduction of regulatory review processes had less to do with the promotion of market values than with inter-branch conflicts (see Percival 1991 Percival , 2001 ). In the 1970s, Congress passed the costliest regulatory statutes in US history. Responding to the above-mentioned critiques of regulatory capture and anxious to assert control over new agencies, legislators wrote exhaustively detailed regulatory statutes that limited the discretionary authority of regulators and, by implication, the capacity of the President to manage the regulatory state. By vesting authority in the OMB within the Executive Office of the President, regulatory review partially redressed the perceived imbalance of power. Although it was convenient in the 1980s to attribute these changes to the Reagan administration"s anti-regulatory ethos, these processes were retained, albeit with modifications, by subsequent presidents, regardless of party affiliation and agenda. One can surmise that they were embraced, in part, to mange the balance of power between the President and Congress.
This essay focuses on deregulation and the role of the market. Advocates of deregulation claimed that the market could produce results superior to the state. And yet, as will be argued below, if we replace the broad and imprecise category of "the market" with a more institutionally-rich understanding of economic governance, we discover that deregulation produced results that often bore little resemblance to classical markets. Rather, what emerged were complex governance structures that, in some ways, served coordinative functions comparable to what had existed under regulation. Moreover, these governance decisions were not simply the product of chance or the search for efficiencies. They were shaped by public policy and investment decisions. The following examination proceeds in three stages. First, it explores the limitations of the market-state dichotomy. Second, it turns to consider regulation and deregulation through the lens of governance, with a brief survey of three cases of deregulation: airlines, surface transportation, and finance. Finally, the discussion concludes with a consideration of the merits of adopting an institutional perspective when considering the dynamics of deregulation.
Public Authority and the Market
Much of our thinking about public policy is shaped by the market-state dichotomy.
The market is portrayed as a pre-political world populated by self-interested rational actors executing mutually beneficial voluntary transactions. In sharp contrast, the state is portrayed a world of coercion in which large bureaucratic organizations impose sanctions to force individuals to do things that they might otherwise choose not to do in hopes of achieving some larger, overarching social goals. The positive theory of market failure offers some technical guidance as to when the state can "intervene" in the market system (See Weimer and Vining 1999, pp. 74-116) . That is, interventions are justified if they address various forms of market failure. Of course, even if such justifications exist, critics caution, the costs of government failure may nonetheless surpass the benefits of intervention. As Charles Wolf, Jr. (1990, p. 6) observed: "The choice in actuality is among imperfect markets, imperfect governments, and various combinations of the two. The cardinal economic choice concerns the degree to which markets or governments-each with their respective flaws-should determine the allocation, use, and distribution of resources in the economy." As powerful as the market-state dichotomy has been in structuring our thinking and public discourse about the political economy (Lindblom 1982) , the conceptual bifurcation veils the variety of institutions subsumed by "the market" and the role that the state plays in creating the institutional foundations for the economy.
Markets are institutions that facilitate the exchange of property. For property rights to be effective, they must be definable, defensible, and divestible or transferable (Yandle 1999) . In each of these dimensions, the state plays a foundational role (e.g., by awarding titles, providing laws that govern transactions, and maintaining institutions for the adjudication of property disputes). Thus, rather than existing as a selfconstituting and self-regulating sphere of human action, markets are constituted by public policies and institutions.
We can gain some additional insights into the state-market nexus by exploring in different industries and cross-nationally (See Campbell, Hollingsworth, and Lindberg 1991 , Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997 , Fligstein 2001 . In this research, social scientists present a "market" not as a synonym for the economy, but as one of an array of governance mechanisms that economic actors can use to coordinate their behavior. In its purest form, a market is a decentralized system of exchange linking formally autonomous actors engaged in a self-liquidating transaction. Although it provides an appropriate means of coordinating behavior when transactions involve standardized goods or commodities, a market does not support the long-term coordination of specific parties nor can it support transactions that involve higher levels of complexity or asset specificity, both of which, under conditions of bounded rationality and informational asymmetry, increase uncertainty and the vulnerability to miscommunication, shirking, and opportunism. Under these conditions, alternative governance mechanisms (e.g., long-term contracting, joint ventures, or, at the extreme, integration) are common. Governance extends to multilateral settings as The evolution of governance regimes-the combination of governance mechanisms in a given industry-cannot be understood without recognizing the role of the state. As noted above, law plays a central role in constituting the economy and facilitating various forms of action. In so doing, it creates an institutional structure within which governance regimes evolve (Campbell and Lindberg 1990) . Antitrust laws determine the extent to which firms can coordinate their behavior through associational activities. There is much to suggest that the great merger wave at the turn of the twentieth century was a response to antitrust prohibitions on conspiracies in restraint of trade that effectively foreclosed associational coordination (Bittlingmayer 1996) .In contrast, other regulatory policies have explicitly promoted the use of associations to coordinate activities within a given industry (e.g., agricultural marketing associations, labor unions, over-the-counter brokerages). In addition to creating the institutional context within which governance regimes evolve, the state may be an actor, setting rates, assigning markets, and/or controlling conditions of entry and exit. This brings us necessarily to a discussion of regulation.
Regulation, Deregulation, and Governance
Although much of the work on governance has focused exclusively on the private sector, if we understand governance as the coordination of economic organizations, then we must recognize the important role played historically by regulatory policies.
As with private governance mechanisms, regulatory agencies coordinate the behavior of economic organizations, thereby bringing greater stability to the industries in The examples of regulation as governance can be extended into social regulation. In the 1990s, the Clinton administration"s "reinvention of government" initiatives involved the creation of myriad public-private partnerships. For example, Partners for the Environment, a collection of reinvention projects, involved collaboration between the EPA and some 11,000 organizations, including corporations, trade and professional associations, state and local regulators, advocacy groups, and research institutions. Many of these partnerships were designed explicitly to create a means of coordinating corporate efforts and disseminating best practices.
A new regulatory green track, the National Environmental Performance Track (or NEPT) was created in 2000 to give greater flexibility in compliance to organizations with a high quality environmental management system and an exhibited capacity for exceeding regulatory goals. The EPA"s Performance Track Participants" Association sponsored annual conferences as vehicles for members to share information and The continued dominance of legacy airlines in a deregulatory environment has been a product of governance decisions. But these decisions have been shaped by public policy in three ways. First, the government is partially responsible for investment in airport expansion and the operation of the air traffic control system.
Additional public financing of airport and gate expansion could facilitate entry.
However, the inadequacy of funding from the Airport and Airways Trust Funddiverted to cover regulatory budgets-has rendered airport authorities dependent on major carriers for financing, thereby extending earlier patterns of control. As
Elizabeth Bailey (2002, p. 17) observes: "instead of using regulation to open competition, airport policy has locked in monopoly elements." Second, the consolidation process described above was facilitated by decisions about antitrust enforcement, which lagged in the 1980s. Third, the federal government, through the policies of the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), has underwritten the profitability of the legacy carriers. As several large carriers used bankruptcy protection to restructure their debt in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001
, the PBGC assumed a significant portion of their defined-benefit pension liabilities (some $8.9 billion). These financial rescues carried a significant quid pro quo. As the PBGC provided a subsidy worth billions of dollars, it acquired a major equity stake in the airline industry. As a result of bankruptcy proceedings, the PBGC was awarded a 7 percent stake in US Airway and, more strikingly, a 23.4 percent stake in United Airlines, making it the single largest investor in the airline (US Government Accountability Office 2006, p. 4). Ironically, under deregulation the state assumed an ownership stake that few would have imagined to be one of the consequences of market-based reforms.
Deregulation and the railroads
The Interstate Commerce Act of 1888 created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to regulate the railroads. After the passage of the Hepburn Act of 1906, the ICC was granted rate-making powers and assumed the role of a classical economic regulator (i.e., controlling entry, exit, the terms of competition, and pricing). With the passage of the Motor Carriers Act of 1935, the ICC"s jurisdiction was extended to At first glance, one would expect these changes to be particularly beneficial for Savings and Loans (S&Ls), chartered to provide liquidity for housing markets. fell into bankruptcy, reporting the largest losses ever incurred by a public or private corporation. Ultimately, the costs would exceed $160 billion (see Rom 1996) .
Deregulation continued despite the S&L debacle and the regulatory firewalls eliminated the regulatory firewalls that might have proven instrumental in limiting the magnitude of the crisis (see Eisner 2011, pp. 180-198) .
Regulatory Reform from an Institutional Perspective
This paper began with some reflections on the inadequacy of the market-state dichotomy that has been used to frame public discourse about deregulation and regulatory reform more generally. It was argued that law plays a central role in constituting the economy, facilitating the activities of economic actors, and shaping decisions about governance. In this final section, we must turn to a simple question:
what is gained by adopting an institutional perspective?
The first response is an empirical one. Classical markets certainly exist and are employed on a regular basis. But as the above cases suggest, one cannot explain the governance in deregulated industries if one works within the broad terms of "the market" versus the state. The dense organizational networks created in the airlines and the long-term bilateral contracts and intermodal alliances in surface transportation are neither self-liquidating nor anonymous; they cannot be described accurately as markets. Moreover, the control over key assets exerted by legacy airlines and consolidated Class 1 railroads have important implications for the relative power of actors within the respective industries. The category of "the market" is simply too broad and imprecise to capture the wide variety of mechanisms that economic actors use to coordinate their behavior and this limitation can be addressed by adopting a governance perspective.
The second response involves the implications for public policy. As noted above, policy analysts who work with the broad categories of the market and the state routinely ask when it is justified for the state to "intervene" in the market. institutions, it is legitimate to demand that elected officials assume responsibility for ensuring that economic actors remain accountable to broader social values. These expectations, which were at the core of the regulatory initiatives of the past century,
are not vanquished as a result of regulatory reform.
